The head teacher of a private day school in London was reported in the press in 2013 to have advised that young children should not be encouraged to have 'best friends', but to have lots of 'good friends' instead. 1 He claimed that having best friends made children vulnerable to hurt, to conflict or bullying caused by 'fallings out' between friends or even to ostracism for some. The head teacher argued that young children were less able to deal with such problems hence 'best friendship' might be better left until an older age when children were more able to cope.
For some readers of this paper, there may be curiosity as to why best friendship should be viewed as being so dangerous as to elicit the opinion that it should be discouraged. Some may simply dismiss the situation as the head teacher mixing up the concepts of friendship and friendliness. For others, it may result in a mild bemusement as to how he (the head teacher) proposes to enforce this. Yet such events have become recurring news items over recent years in the UK and beyond and are often left unchallenged in both philosophical and educational circles.
Whilst many primary schools give some attention in PSHE (or in circle times) as to how children themselves should approach problems caused by their fallings out, this does not always follow through into how schools themselves think about or deal with the friendships of children. For many schools, friendship tends to be something schools have to 'work around' or is viewed as a site of possible disruption whereas for young children, school is often viewed as the place where they get to see and play with their friends, particularly their 'best friends'. Leaving to one side empirical issues as to whether children use the phrase 'best friend' in the same way as adults (or with the same exclusivity), the seeming contrast between how schools view friendship and how children value friendship can be stark. Teachers may express misgivings about letting friends sit together or to work together for fear of disruption in the classroom and/or lack of focus on the learning task. Others sometimes voice misgivings that children will overly favour their friends in some way, to the detriment of other classmates (fears that a 'priority of attachment' with particular friends may violate other principles we also hold dear, frequently related to purported understandings of equality in one form or another). Such arguments often lead to practices ranging from deliberately separating friends in the classroom to the splitting of friendship groups between parallel classes.
The temptation may be to think that, whilst this may be interesting for those teachers of youngish children, it may not be that important a topic for philosophy of education itself. This would be a mistake: I want to suggest the implications go far beyond whether or not children should be encouraged to have best friends (which in and of itself may turn out to be largely an empirical claim) in that it causes us to think about how we treat those who are not like us, who do not 'belong in our gang' all of which is crucially important in our moral thinking and thus an important issue for schools. This paper offers a preliminary examination of what tends to be referred to as the 'dark side' of friendship. Whilst philosophers such as Patricia White have previously alluded to its existence (White 1990) , there has been little philosophical scrutiny in any broad terms elsewhere. This is particularly curious in that much of the empirical research on friendship seems to focus on undesirable behaviour 'caused' by the relationship in some way. Using the above example, I explore this 'dark side' by focussing on three claims derived from the above example: that children can be friends with everyone; that young children are developmentally incapable of 'real' friendship hence best friendship should be avoided until later age; that only good people can be good friends. I want to argue that the head teacher is correct to be worried about the problems he cites, but for very different reasons. If friendship does indeed have a 'dark side', this is more a failure to expand our moral concerns outwards from those we are closest to rather than a conceptual difficulty caused by friendship itself. This then indicates a crucial role for educators and schools in filling this gap.
What is friendship?
A plethora of literature studying friendship from both empirical and theoretical perspectives has traditionally focussed on either the perceived link with moral development, or on the development of intimate relationships or on links to our personal well-being (see the work of Blum 1980 , Selman 1980 , Buhrmester 1990 ). All of this has led to the general agreement (crossing disciplines) that friendship is both advantageous and desirable for both parties. This stance has been reinforced by more recent empirical research focussing specifically on the utility that can be drawn from friendship, particularly in such areas as peer support (Buote, Pancer et al. 2007 ) and elder care (Barker 2002) .
Within the philosophical domain, the concept of 'friend' (philia) used in many of the Greek exemplars on friendship is widely acknowledged to cover a multitude of areas, from those relationships of many years to those of slight acquaintanceship, which can make direct comparisons with the present difficult (Cooper 1991 , Pahl 2000 . Aristotle, for example, purports that intimate relationships are a necessary part of the flourishing life (Aristotle 1155a5): all things being equal, a life with friendships and close relationships is viewed as being more desirable than a life without. The overriding presumption within the Aristotelian model is that friendship is always towards the good. Less often addressed is the possibility that friendship may have a 'dark side' (White 1990, 82) or what this might consist of.
The first point to make re the concept of friendship is that one cannot be a friend in isolation: it requires the existence of another person. Whilst we have the concept of unrequited love for situations where the love is unreturned, this does not hold for friendship. The affection and support we associate with friendship excludes a one-sided relationship: it must be mutual.
2 Secondly, friendship requires something of both parties -the being friendly, a liking or loving emotional involvement, a 'being a friend' in wanting and actively trying to benefit the other, a wishing for their good, and an involvement in some mutuallyacceptable way in each others' lives. Thirdly, to call someone a friend is to see him or her as being special, thus to set someone apart from those who are 'not friends'. The implication here is that we behave, feel and act differently towards our friends than our non-friends; whilst we may not explicitly promise particular actions or behaviours to our friends, the presumption is that it should have at least some implications for behaviour by ruling in (or out) particular ways of acting. Given that friends may occupy a different place in our thinking to non-friends, we can only expect that best friends will be a further distinctive (and even more exclusive) grouping than the category of friends.
The further point to make is that there is a temporal aspect to friendship: it is not possible to decide to be friends with someone -and then suddenly to be so. It takes time to build the friendship: exploring each other's character, tastes, likes, dislikes, opinions etc. This type of engagement and the depth of knowledge of the other can only be experienced with a few and not with everyone we encounter: none of our lives are long enough to devote the amount of time it would require. Thus the expectation of children to be 'friends with everyone' (as opposed to being sociable or friendly), would be unachievable (even if held to be desirable). What becomes clearer from this account is that friendship has to be understood as being more than just general socialisation skills. We need a distinction between friendship and friendliness: friendship can only be shared with a few, whilst we can be friendly towards many.
First claim: The dark side of friendship
So what exactly does the head teacher see as being dangerous or 'the dark side' of friendship? To answer this, we need to start from the point that all friendships create boundaries: they indicate those who are friends and equally those outside of the friendship. By calling someone a friend we are denoting a particular status to him or her in our thinking that sets him or her apart from those who do not share that status. We are not restricted to having just one friend neither does having a friend preclude that person from being someone else's friend as well -but each pairing will be different.
Most of us are enmeshed in a variety of different, complex friendship networks which may be at varying levels of intimacy and attachment. But when it comes to 'best friendship', we can refer to 'the best kind' of friendship or 'the best people' or simply 'those we choose to be closest to'. There is something even more 'special' about these friendships than others, hence the sheer volume of literature trying to identify what this might consist of (Annas 1977 , Sherman 1987 , Blum 1993 , Helm 2010 , Nehamas 2010 . The trust may be deeper, the mutual affection more intense, our inclination to protect or support may be more multilayered; this can make the boundaries of those inside (and thus those left outside) appear tighter and more rigid. In all of these cases the relationship is perhaps most akin to the depth of attachment (and subsequent virtues) depicted by Aristotle as virtue friendship (Aristotle) or by Cocking and Kennett as companionate friendship (Cocking and Kennett 1998) .
To really understand the head teacher's concerns in this area, we must remember, however, that it is not friendship per se that the head teacher found troubling, but 'best friendship' springing from the exclusivity problems associated with the relationship. Indeed, many of the charges laid by the head teacher focus specifically on those left outside the boundaries of such friendship. For example, just because Billy is left out of the friendship of Callum and Eamonn, it does not preclude him from having a friend at all. However, if Billy is left out of all possible friendships, it could become problematic for the very reasons the head teacher cites. The extensive research in this area does seem to indicate that the ensuing rejection, ostracism or loneliness that can follow often come with significant tensions and conflicts, all of which can be disruptive to learning in the classroom or for the future emotional and social well-being of the child. So let's follow the path of evidence the head teacher may have taken to arrive at his conclusion.
Rejection
Conceptually, to be rejected as a friend suggests one has to have first offered or been available for friendship and then to have the offer turned down or ignored (whether consciously or unconsciously).
3 In a similar vein, the 'rejected' child might be one who occupies the role of 'substitute friend' -someone who is a 'temporary friend' in the absence of the real friend -and who is then dropped on the return of the desired other. However, as friendship is a voluntary relationship (and can be ended by either party without negotiation) even just the threat of rejection can impact on the balance of power within the relationship. There is the danger that one person might become subservient to the other to avoid the threatened ending.
All children undoubtedly have experiences that could be termed rejection in some form, whether in the shape of peer teasing, the momentary absence of a playmate or the more serious forms of bullying and exclusion (which are extreme forms of rejection). Whilst many children seem to negotiate their way through these events relatively easily, others can be caught in a seeming downward spiral of 'rejection', especially if they experience rejection across many domains (school, neighbourhood, home etc). Research even seems to suggest that being 'peer-rejected' can be fairly regular in occurrence for some groups of children. Mikami et al, for example, claim that around half of children rejected at any given time will also suffer rejection at a further date (Mikami, Boucher et al. 2005) . This continual experience of rejection as a 'possible friend' has been associated with an increased emotional/social vulnerability, with being more likely to drop out of school, with engagement in criminality or with suffering from anxiety and depression in later life (Sandstrom 2004) .
Ostracism
Ostracism, on the other hand, goes far beyond peer-rejection to encompass behaviours that communicate dislike of a child in perhaps a more non-confrontational manner. This is often demonstrated by restricting access to joint enterprises, by chronic peer exclusion and social isolation. In extreme cases, this may degenerate into viewing the other as an 'enemy', or by deliberately sabotaging work or equipment, often at school itself. Normally, being accepted as a member of a group of friends means being included within the system of everyday reciprocities within that 'community', hence being denied access through ostracism is to see and treat another as 'undeserving' of access to mutual benefits. Here the boundary of who is 'in' and who is 'out' is not based on the partiality we undoubtedly show to our particular friends when we choose or favour them, but the complete removal of any duties or responsibilities at all towards those outside of the bond hence the significance of such occurrences for moral education.
There can be few things as emotionally damaging for a young child as being made to feel they neither matter nor belong. This form of chronic victimisation of students by their peers (ostracism) goes beyond just emotional damage (serious as this is), to severely affecting the child's academic learning. We know from research that in being denied engagement in class activities, poor academic achievement in later years becomes much more likely for this group (Hawes, Zadro et al. 2012) .
Loneliness
For children, loneliness (when seen as the outcome of friendlessness) can be considered to be one of the most miserable experiences of childhood (White 1990) . Being the only one without a playmate whilst all around you are paired off or in ready-set groups, being always left out of games at playtime (not as ostracised but as being the 'invisible' child) has long been argued to undermine both the confidence and social competence of children across domains (from increased social anxiety, to low self-esteem, to hyper-sensitivity and depression). Some children undoubtedly take longer to develop 'best friendship' than others or may indeed feel 'left out' amongst their peers who might have strong established social groups. To paraphrase Aristotle, whilst the wish for a friend may come quickly; achieving this may not (Aristotle, NE).
Obviously, there is a difference between being alone and being lonely: most of us will relish being alone at least sometimes. But to be alone all of the time, when one desires closeness and interdependency with others, can serve to make school life unbearable for some. Indeed, Palmen et al suggest that this group (those without friends and those unable to make or maintain friends) may be more at risk that generally thought (Palmen, Vermande et al. 2011) : that this is may be more of an indicator of future maladjustment than being a child with aggressive friends.
Surely any person involved in the education of children would rightly be concerned about such possible outcomes of these three problems? Now, we may be tempted to rethink our initial response to the head-teacher, and consider that perhaps he might be on to something. However, there is copious research to suggest that in such situations as described previously, close friendships may serve as a protective support or comfort. Even just having one relationship may act as a social buffer against peer rejection (those who are left out of group activities, who are targets for teasing, bullying or ostracism). Nevertheless, we need to be careful not to draw unwarranted conclusions from this: peer victimisation may occur whether or not a child has a best friend.
Part of the problem is undoubtedly that friendship and being friendly are being set up as an 'either/or' choice in his argument: you can either have a few good friends (risking the hurt and difficulties in negotiating friendship) or you can be friends with everyone (an impossibility in the same depth -and probably more typically, being friendly). But the choice between the two is a false one: children need to develop both sets of skills, aptitudes and attachments to interact with civility to those within and those outside of the bond. Even if we accept that friendship is a relationship of special regard for a particular other, this does not itself entail that there are no obligations at all to those left outside.
Second claim: The development of friendship
All schooling to some extent involves socialisation (in the sense of learning to be both in the world and with others) and popular theories of child development have long acknowledged the powerful influence that friendship plays in the social and moral life of the child (Piaget 1932 /1965 , Crocker 1977 , Kohlberg 1981 , Ainsworth 1988 . Indeed, 'achieving friendship' is often seen as a major goal for many preschool and early school settings: that is, encouraging and raising children to be social, friendly, polite and empathetic to others' feelings.
Here, I want to make two points. First, many of these theories can be classified as 'stage theories' in that they ascribe particular characteristics to particular age groups. Often based on the cognitive developmental approach adopted by Robert Selman (Selman 1980) , many studies concentrate on changes in social perspective-taking and intimacy to account for an individual's increasingly complex interactions in the social world. But suggesting that children should be denied the pleasures of particular friendships whilst young because they are less able to deal with the emotional problems brought on by conflict and less capable to negotiate through the intricacies of social relationships, seems to be misinterpreting the basis for social development and to suggest some unspoken 'hazy' form of 'friendshipreadiness'.
Undoubtedly, as biological entities, we change and grow through time. Some of those changes are related to the stage of our biological development: the ability to eat and digest solid food; the ability to reproduce. Others may be the results of both biology and social conditions (for example, the development of shared language). Others, still, depend on our ability to build on our past experiences to understand and negotiate our present and future experiences. Saying that children around a particular age are more 'capable' of best friendship may simply indicate that the cumulative effect of the experiences they have previously had, the joys and the disappointments, the experiences of trusting, being betrayed or abandoned, mean they have more to draw on when coping with the present problems in relationships. The development of many of the features of best friendship such as deep trust, the development of intimacy, of love and affection, of tolerance, of reciprocal actions, all these take time and opportunities to develop in real relationships. Being discouraged from forming best friendships, or denied the opportunity to nurture these until a particular age then seems somehow incoherent as a response.
The second point to make here is that theorists such as Bukowski and Hoza have long argued that specific forms of peer relationship may be conceptually distinct and associated with different contributions to social development than other peer relationships (Bukowski and Hoza 1989) . Research by Berndt, amongst others, reinforces this distinction, suggesting that best friendship can offer a special support over and beyond that derived from simple peer relationships (Berndt 1982 , Buhrmester 1990 ). In fact a deeper reading of the empirical literature suggests that having a close friendship (or best friendship) may be a key site of support which can be particularly important in alleviating the psychological stress and adjustment difficulties associated with major changes (Brooks 2007 , Buote, Pancer et al. 2007 , Kingery, Erdley et al. 2011 . In other words, 'best friendship' has a special utility value in supporting those undergoing these critical periods of stress.
This achieves pertinence within the realm of schooling in that 'transitioning' pupils/students make the transition more easily when they can access the support from close relationships such as friends. As children commonly go through many transitions, whether between schools, key stages, or even changes of class and teacher in primary schools, it would seem reasonable to suppose that doing so with the help of another would make the process easier. Indeed Kingery et al posit that "adolescents who do not have a strong social network (e.g., fewer friends, lower-quality friendships) in late elementary school may not have a secure base to rely upon when navigating the transition" (Kingery, Erdley et al. 2011, 218) . This would suggest that, if only on instrumental grounds, schools may be better off encouraging the development of 'best friendship' rather than denying it.
Third claim: friendship and morality revisited
Here we start to unravel some of the conceptual tangles around what we mean by a 'good friend' that seem to be hidden within the head teacher's stance, some of which go to the heart of current thinking on friendship and morality. Implicit in the head teacher's view is the belief that 'best friendship' puts children in some form of danger from the shifting boundaries of who counts as one of us, and who does not: the insiders (those who are included) and outsiders (those who are excluded). Generally speaking, such borders serve the purpose of determining partiality towards those who are included and rejection or discrimination against those who are excluded. In other words, those who are included are regarded as specially deserving of fairness and justice in treatment, and of particular support and help when hurt.
What is particularly curious, however, in our example is the head teacher's association of best friendship with vices towards others when, generally speaking, friendship is usually associated with virtue and/or moral behaviour. This association with virtue has a long distinguished history: psychologists such as William Damon argue that the ability to place oneself in the position of another, being able to see oneself as separate, is key to moral development. Philosophers such as Laurence Blum, argue that "Friendship thus involves an orientation of our (moral) selves towards another person" (Blum 1980, 73) . Anthropologists such as Bell and Coleman credit friendship as introducing a moral component into our behaviour with non-kin (Bell and Coleman 1999) .
At a simple level, the first argument is usually voiced as friendship opens us up to the moral life in particular ways, by providing the motivation to sacrifice some of our own interests for the sake of the loved friend. Much of this thinking can be traced back to the Aristotelian view that friendship is a particular way through which we can achieve eudemonia: friendship "is a virtue or involves virtue; and it is an absolute necessity in life" (Aristotle NE, VIII.I). The philosophical tradition of limiting true friendship 4 "to the morally virtuous" (Nehamas 2010, 274) , that has come to be drawn from the Aristotelian typology of utility, pleasure or virtue friendships 5 , has more or less continued in various guises in much of the popular discourse. Now, few of us could realistically reach the level of being completely virtuous, so it would seem at first to suggest that most of us could never experience this type of friendship. John Cooper, however, challenges this interpretation and suggests a more realistic view, arguing that Aristotle's vision of perfect virtue is better placed within a wide spectrum of virtue friendships, hence an individual would not need to show every kind of virtue, but only need some good qualities to attract and hold a possible friend (Cooper 1977 , Cooper 1999 .
Whilst this leaves open the opportunity of developing virtue friendships to those of us who are not complete paragons, it is clear the link is still retained (albeit weaker) between moral virtue and friendship.
This argument was recently revisited by Elder (Elder 2014) , who argues for a much more eudaemonist view on friendship reaffirming the view that the best friends must be good people. Elder argues that "the best friendships are those between friends who share at least some important values. Shared values promote closeness, which is central to friendship" (Elder 2014, 95) . He reminds us that for the Aristotelian, character matters to one's wellbeing and that virtue plays an important part in the best lives. Now, it seems to me that a morally virtuous person in one situation would act in a morally virtuous way in not only one situation, but also in another: there would have to be consistency of action. In other words, a person who exhibited the virtues solely with their best friend, but was vicious, unkind and unethical with others, could not possibly be described as "morally virtuous". Hence, the development of the virtues between best friends does not preclude our acting morally to those outside the bond -if anything it suggests that to be truly virtuous, the moral boundaries have to expand beyond the friendship.
But Elder goes further than this to assert that it is in the best interest of good people not to choose bad people as their friends as this could lead to the possible corruption of the virtuous. He asserts that being close to the wrong individuals can deprive persons of at least some of the virtues needed to live a good life, as they cannot be relied on to consistently promote each other's good. 6 There are three related responses to be made here. First, as Jeske points out, we often begin interacting with someone before we can ascertain his or her character, before we come to know all the good or weak character traits of the person (Jeske 1997) . In fact, we may come to care about them, despite their failures or weaknesses and yet still have good reason to remain in the friendship. Just because a person may have some character flaws, this does not necessarily preclude them from all possible friendships. Secondly, on first appearances, this appears to suggest a particularly ego-centric view of the self, acting to one's own advantage which would then itself lack the 'other-centeredness' seen as critical to virtue friendship. Yet Aristotle (on whom Elder bases much of his argument) clearly does not expect the virtuous to drop their 'corrupted' friends as a first resort: the expectation is that the virtuous person, because of their virtue, would try to reform their friend and return them to their original position -only if they prove irredeemable, should the friendship be avoided. The only way this can be made sense of is to see friendship as not being so much an end-state, but as a practice, a 'life lived together', through which we become better friends. Thirdly, just as friends can be attracted to one another on the basis of virtue and admirable qualities, they can also be attracted on the basis of vices and "weaknesses of character" (White 1990, 84) . Most teachers of children will have memories of teaching at least some children who seem to be drawn together more by the shared engagement in less admirable activities. Similarly, when friendships start to dissolve (whether temporarily or permanently), the very activities engaged in by most friends (such as the sharing of secrets) 7 can put one person in danger of betrayal by the other. Now, it is perfectly possible that two friends may be 'good' to each other: thoughtful, supportive, affectionate -but their behaviour to others outside of the friendship can be thoughtless, unaccommodating and downright cruel.
8 It would seem somewhat contrary to experience to argue, as Elder does, that those involved in such behaviour cannot be classified as 'good friends' at all because the result or outcome of their relationship is harmful to others (or even to themselves) in some way. Even 'bad' people can have (and be) good friends to some! Similarly we cannot assume that the outcome of all good friendships will be virtuous: friendship can not only be expressed through good deeds, but "can be expressed even through crime, cruelty and immorality" (Nehamas 2010, 276-7) . If, as Cooper argues, virtue friendship is better seen as part of a wide spectrum, perhaps 'vice friendships' might form part of this spectrum.
It is not unknown for children to form friendships that 'bring out the worst in them' (partners in crime) rather than the best. If this results in disruption in the classroom, there can undoubtedly be justification for practices such as splitting up particular pairings. But we must be clear: the problem is the disruption caused, not the friendship. Furthermore, we also have to bear in mind that there may be good reasons for some children to be rejected as possible friends: perhaps they are someone who has shown themselves to be untrustworthy or domineering in the past; they might be rejected out of fear (peer rejection in children and aggressive behaviour have often been linked). This then suggests a role for school staff to actively support those individuals who may be struggling with forming or maintaining friendships. 
Conclusion: What can schools do?
As stated at the beginning, I want to argue that the head teacher is right to be concerned about the 'dark side' of friendship (when viewed as concern for those outside of the boundaries of friendship) but incorrect in his conclusions. As the empirical evidence cited here seems to suggest, he should be concerned with the problems of ostracism, loneliness and rejection. But if it was merely to alleviate these named dangers (rejection, ostracism and loneliness), the empirical evidence seems to suggest the exact opposite to his actions: he may be better off encouraging best friendship to alleviate the sheer misery of these three tribulations. These are not problems attributable directly to 'best friendship', but signs of a failure to develop what are referred to in the psychological literature as 'prosocial skills', or of the failure to expand our moral thinking beyond those close to us. Whilst it would be implausible to offer an account of friendship that excluded the specialness of friendship as counting for nothing in discussions of moral obligations and expectations, these are not the only obligations we may have. I think it is this that the head teacher should be trying to voice:
7 Friends give each other privileged access to each other's secrets that is not usually available to everyone (see the work of Youniss (1981) for example. This sharing of personal thoughts and feelings, the depth of knowledge each develops about the other over time, binds friends together. 8 I am thinking in particular of actions such as group bullying. Research on aggressive behaviour (such as bullying in schools) has often demonstrated that this can be often a group process in which children can reinforce each other through the shared behaviour. (See: Salmivalli, C. (1999) . "Participant role approach to school bullying: Implications for interventions." Journal of adolescence 22(4): 453-459.). Similarly, it is possible for a Nazi soldier to be a good friend with other Nazis whilst being monstrous to those judged by their belief system to be outside and undeserving of common humanity. It should also be born in mind that relational 'disorders' such as folie a deux, cult memberships, perhaps even gang or terrorist groupings, can also show some features of close friendship to each other. 9 This is a common practice in Nurture Groups and some behaviour units for example.
how do we encourage and develop a sense of care, compassion and moral behaviour towards others? How do we expand our moral thinking beyond those we are most drawn to?
So what exactly should schools do? All the evidence seems to suggest that schools are crucial actors in the area of social inclusion. Mikami et al suggest it is only by putting the emphasis onto what the teachers and schools can do that we will adequately address this problem: creating socially-accepting school environments that actively discourage peer rejection by promoting cooperative rather than competitive behaviour (Mikami, Boucher et al. 2005) . Indeed, Paley's well-known book in this area reminds us that social exclusion is a group phenomenon, and it is the responsibility of teachers to ensure children are not excluded (Paley 1993) . Similarly, Dill et al suggest that it is the early intervention and active attempts by teachers to encourage friendships and social inclusion that may be crucial in preventing the negative consequences of lack of friends (Dill, Vernberg et al. 2004) .
Undoubtedly this promotion of peer acceptance and the prevention of peer rejection can be time consuming and cumbersome in the classroom, which may partially explain the tendency of some schools to shy away from addressing the issues. Yet there are significant things that we have the evidence to show can make a difference. First, school staff should be aware of those children 'at risk' of rejection, ostracism and loneliness and to have a shared agreement for how to address or alleviate such issues. Secondly, Patricia White reminds us that learning to do things with others, sharing games, the general give and take in classroom life teaches us important social skills and this might play a significant role here (White 1990) . But being allowed to (sometimes) these activities with our best friends can also play a further, crucial role: it can also teach young children about the limits of friendship partiality in the relatively safe (and usually monitored) space that schools can supply. We cannot insist someone becomes friends with another but we can, and should, encourage a basic level of civility and moral awareness of the rights and needs of others beyond our best friends.
